Introduction
In 2024, 53,000 patients underwent IVF in the United Kingdom, almost three times as many as in the early 1990s. Every embryo created is subject to an absolute veto: either gamete provider may withdraw consent to its use at any time before transfer, for any reason, irrespective of the other party’s position. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has described the consent regime as complex and called for its overhaul; and in the House of Lords, Baroness Deech warned that it “has led to difficult litigation, especially in cases of relationship breakdown”. This essay argues that Parliament should give pre-treatment embryo disposition agreements legal force and provide statutory compensation where no enforceable agreement exists.
The Current Law and the Case for Reform
The consent regime governing the
creation, storage, and use of human embryos in the United Kingdom is set out in
Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, as amended by
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 and the Health and Care Act
2022. The framework imposes four
requirements. First, consent must be given in writing. Second, a person who has
given consent may vary or withdraw it by giving notice to the person keeping
the embryo. Third, consent cannot be withdrawn once the embryo has been used in providing
treatment services. Fourth, each gamete provider must give effective consent to any use of an
embryo; a withdrawal by either party renders the embryo unusable for treatment.
The practical effect is stark. Either
party holds a veto that requires no reason, overrides any prior agreement and
cannot be overridden by judicial discretion, leaving the other party without
remedy. The HFEA’s 2023 report described
the consent regime as “far more detailed and stringent than for any other types
of human tissue”, yet acknowledged that “both clinics and patients report
difficulties with obtaining properly informed consent”. In September 2026, the
HFEA confirmed that “the rules governing consent are established in law, and
any changes would be a matter for government to consider”.
The case for reform rests on three
grounds: the investment and reliance involved in IVF treatment, the injustice
that unconditional withdrawal can produce, and the availability of a more
proportionate approach within the margin of appreciation the European
Convention on Human Rights affords the United Kingdom.
First,
the investment. IVF treatment involves a substantial emotional, physical, and
financial commitment for both parties. A full NHS IVF cycle is priced at £3,764,
yet only 30% of embryos transferred in 2024 resulted in a birth, so many
patients undergo repeated attempts. The physical burden falls
disproportionately on the person undergoing egg retrieval, who must endure
hormonal stimulation, monitoring, and an invasive egg-collection procedure
under sedation. Both parties invest significant emotional capital throughout, jointly deciding
how many embryos to create and store, proceeding on the shared understanding
that the embryos will be available for future use. Parliament has begun to recognise
the gravity of this investment: from April 2027, the Employment Rights Act 2025
will entitle employees who suffer an IVF embryo transfer loss to up to two
weeks’ unpaid bereavement leave.[11] Yet the consent regime
itself offers no protection against a change of mind, and no remedy when it
comes.
Second, the injustice. The paradigm case
is Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd. Following a pre-cancerous
diagnosis, Natallie Evans and her then fiancé created six embryos before her
ovaries were surgically removed, making them her final opportunity for genetic
motherhood. When the relationship ended, her former partner withdrew consent. The
embryos were to be destroyed, leaving Ms Evans without remedy or genetic
parenthood. The Court of Appeal held that the clear
statutory text allowed for no judicial exceptions. In Evans v United
Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that this outcome did not breach Article 8
because the United Kingdom’s approach fell within its margin of appreciation. Crucially, the Court did
not hold that the Convention requires an absolute veto. It treated the balance
between the parties’ competing Article 8 rights as a matter for domestic
policy, declining to accord greater weight to Ms Evans’s right to become a
genetic parent than her former partner’s right not to. The United Kingdom chose
a bright-line rule mandating continuous, mutual consent.
Third, the Convention permits reform. The
margin of appreciation recognised in Evans is wide in practice as well
as in principle. Several Council of Europe member states restrict withdrawal
far more than the United Kingdom. In Austria and Estonia, a man’s consent may
be revoked only up to the point of fertilisation, after which the woman alone
decides whether to proceed; in Italy, neither party may normally withdraw
consent after fertilisation. In Hungary, absent a
contrary agreement by the couple, the woman may proceed with treatment even
after her partner’s death or their divorce. In S.H. and Others v
Austria, the Grand Chamber reaffirmed that the margin is wide where
assisted reproduction raises ethical questions on which there is no European
consensus, while warning that this evolving area must be kept under review.
It might be objected that making consent
binding before transfer would be alien to domestic law. It is not. In mitochondrial
donation, consent to the use of an egg or embryo cannot be varied or withdrawn
once its nuclear DNA has been transferred, before any embryo is placed in the
womb. Parliament has therefore accepted
that consent may become binding before transfer where the process requires it.
The question is not whether reform is lawful, but what form it should take.
Three broad alternatives present
themselves, and each falls short. The first is to adopt the Italian model of
irrevocability: once embryos are created, neither party may withdraw their
consent to their use. While this approach would likely fall within the margin of
appreciation, it resolves nothing in practice: a woman who declines transfer
cannot be compelled to undergo it, leaving the embryos in storage until they
perish and achieving neither parenthood nor closure for either party.
The second is to treat embryos as
property, giving one or both parties ownership rights enforceable through the
ordinary law of personal property. The Grand Chamber in Parrillo v Italy
held that, given the economic scope of Article 1 of Protocol No 1, human embryos
cannot be reduced to “possessions”. More fundamentally, both
parties would be co-owners, so a property model would reproduce the deadlock
rather than resolve it. The third alternative is to retain the current
framework but soften its edges, for example by introducing a mandatory mediation
requirement before withdrawal takes effect. However, this addresses none of the
structural defects: mediation cannot compel agreement, and the absolute veto
remains intact at the end of the process. What is needed is a mechanism that
respects autonomy while giving legal weight to reliance.
This essay proposes a reform to Schedule
3 to the 1990 Act, comprising two integrated components. At present, even a
signed agreement between the parties has no legal force against a unilateral
withdrawal. The first component would change this: where the parties have
executed a valid Embryo Disposition Agreement (“EDA”) before treatment, its
terms would take precedence over withdrawal, subject to the safeguards set out
below. The second applies where no enforceable EDA exists: the right to
withdraw consent before transfer would remain, but a party who exercises it may
be liable to compensate the other.
Component One: Enforceable Embryo Disposition Agreements
The justification is consent. An EDA would be presumptively enforceable by either party, so the state would not dictate a reproductive outcome; it would hold the parties who freely committed, with full knowledge and independent advice, to the outcome they chose for themselves. Applications to enforce or set aside an EDA would be made to the Family Court, which already gives effect to nuptial agreements freely entered into with full appreciation of their implications.
Scope
An EDA would specify what is to happen
to embryos in the event of separation, divorce, death, incapacity, or
disagreement between the parties. The agreement could provide for embryos to be
used by one party for treatment, donated for the treatment of others, donated
for research, stored for a defined period, or allowed to perish. The parties
would decide this for themselves, in advance, when they are aligned and
cooperative, not after the relationship has broken down and positions have
hardened. An EDA also addresses a real difficulty where one party has died or
lost capacity: in Parrillo, the Court had no evidence of what the
deceased partner would have wanted. An EDA removes that
uncertainty by recording both parties’ intentions in advance. Clinics would
record the EDA’s terms on the standard HFEA consent forms. The difference is
that either party may withdraw their own consent on those forms at any time,
whereas a valid EDA could not be undone by one party alone; if the two later conflict,
the EDA would prevail.
One consequential amendment is required.
Although the Health and Care Act 2022 extended the maximum embryo storage
period to fifty-five years, it limited storage after a person’s death to ten
years, after which their consent is treated as withdrawn. Without amendment, clinics
would have to dispose of embryos after a decade, overriding the period the
couple agreed. The proposed reform would provide that a valid EDA’s specified
posthumous period displaces this ten-year statutory default, subject to the
overall fifty-five-year maximum.
Conditions for Enforceability
To ensure that consent to an EDA is
genuine and informed, the agreement would only be enforceable if it is in
writing and signed by both parties; each party has received independent legal
advice; each party has received counselling from a qualified counsellor as to
the emotional, psychological, and relational implications, a requirement
stronger than the existing opportunity for counselling; at least 14 days have
elapsed between execution and the creation of any embryo, unless treatment is
clinically urgent; and each party has been expressly informed that the
agreement is legally enforceable. These requirements are
deliberately rigorous. They are modelled on safeguards English law already applies
where a binding commitment must rest on genuine understanding: nuptial
agreements, settlement agreements in employment law, and guarantees given by
one partner for the other’s debts.
It may be objected that enforceability
pressures the more vulnerable party when they are anxious to begin treatment.
The risk is real, but it is precisely what the conditions address: advice
ensures understanding, counselling helps reveal any pressure, and the cooling-off
period gives each party time to reconsider before the agreement takes effect. Where
urgency removes that period, the grounds for setting aside remain.
Grounds for Setting Aside
A court may decline to enforce an EDA where
consent was obtained through coercion, duress, or undue influence; where one
party lacked mental capacity within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005;
where there is evidence of domestic abuse in the relationship, whether at the
time of execution or subsequently; or where enforcement would be manifestly
unjust in light of circumstances that could not reasonably have been foreseen.
As a public authority, the Family Court would
be required to act compatibly with both parties’ Convention rights when
deciding whether to enforce an EDA. Together with the grounds
for setting aside, this ensures that the court retains the discretion needed to
protect the objecting party’s Article 8 rights, satisfying the requirement of
proportionality.
Bodily Autonomy
One safeguard is absolute: nothing in an
EDA, and nothing in the proposed statutory provisions, may compel any person to
undergo embryo transfer or any other medical procedure. The safeguard is framed
in sex-neutral terms, so that it applies equally to all parties and does not
discriminate on grounds of sex contrary to Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, read with Article 8. In practice, it protects
women, since only a woman can undergo embryo transfer.
The same principle protects third parties.
An EDA binds only the parties who sign it, so it cannot compel a surrogate to
accept transfer; any surrogacy arrangement is in any event unenforceable by or
against the persons making it. Where an EDA provides for
embryos to be transferred to a surrogate, enforcement does not engage the
objecting party’s bodily integrity, only the objecting party’s interest in not
becoming a genetic parent, which is precisely the interest the EDA resolves in
advance. Such provisions would therefore be enforceable on the same terms as
any other, subject to the grounds for setting aside.
Welfare of the Child
Clinics must take account of the welfare of any child who may be born before providing treatment. The reform would not displace that duty: an order enforcing an EDA would settle whose consent governs the embryos; it would not require a clinic to provide treatment contrary to its own clinical or welfare judgement. To prevent the welfare assessment being used as a back door around an enforceable agreement, however, the HFEA’s guidance on the welfare assessment in its Code of Practice would state that the objecting party’s objection, or the existence of a dispute over an EDA, is not in itself evidence of risk to a future child. A refusal on welfare grounds would have to rest on the clinic’s own assessment of objective evidence.
Component Two: Statutory Compensation
Where one party withdraws consent and there is no enforceable EDA, because none was executed or because the court declined to enforce it, the other party may apply to the Family Court for an order requiring the withdrawing party to compensate them for the loss the withdrawal causes. No order may be made in favour of an applicant where the EDA was set aside because of that applicant’s own coercion, duress, undue influence or domestic abuse; otherwise, the scheme would reward the very conduct that led the court to set the agreement aside. The scheme compensates loss; it does not punish withdrawal, which remains lawful.
Heads of Compensation
The court may award compensation under
three heads. First, reimbursement of quantifiable financial losses: treatment
fees, medication costs, diagnostic and monitoring costs, travel expenses, and
lost earnings directly attributable to the IVF process; these can be proved by
receipts. Second, a discretionary award for emotional distress, assessed by
reference to the impact of withdrawal on the applicant, including the loss of
the prospect of genetic parenthood. English law already values psychological harm
in personal injury and clinical negligence claims using the Judicial College
Guidelines; this head would draw on that existing practice.
Third, the costs of future fertility
treatment reasonably required as a consequence of the withdrawal. For patients
treated on the NHS, who incur no direct treatment fees but may have exhausted a
limited allocation of funded cycles, this head would include the cost of
replacing those cycles privately, so that NHS patients are not disadvantaged
relative to private patients. Where further treatment is no longer clinically
possible, for example because of age, nothing is recoverable under this head;
that loss is instead reflected in the award for emotional distress. Under every
head, any sum already recovered for the same loss, such as a clinic refund,
would be deducted to prevent double recovery.
Assessment of Quantum
In assessing quantum, the court must
have regard to five factors: the stage at which consent was withdrawn; the
reason for withdrawal, including whether it reflected a genuine change of
circumstances; the degree of reliance placed by the applicant on the respondent’s
consent; the conduct of both parties; and the financial circumstances of both
parties. These factors may reduce an award below the applicant’s full loss but
never raise it above that loss.
To prevent disproportionate claims while
ensuring meaningful redress, awards should be subject to a cap set by statutory
instrument, allowing it to be adjusted without further primary legislation, as
Parliament has done for bereavement damages. Having regard to the costs
identified above, together with a reasonable allowance for emotional distress,
an initial cap of £100,000 is proposed. An application for a compensation order
must be made within twelve months of the applicant being notified of the withdrawal.
This mirrors the twelve-month period for which embryos remain in lawful storage
after consent is withdrawn, giving the applicant time to take advice while
protecting the respondent from stale claims.
Compensation orders would be made in
family proceedings and would therefore survive the respondent’s bankruptcy
unless the court directs otherwise. They could be enforced
through charging orders and attachment of earnings. The scheme can only
compensate where the respondent has the means to pay; it cannot guarantee
recovery.
Implementation
The reform would require primary legislation to amend Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act, inserting new paragraphs to provide for the enforceability of EDAs and the statutory compensation scheme, with a standard form of EDA prescribed by statutory instrument. The HFEA would be required to update its Code of Practice to ensure clinics offer EDA preparation, including referral to independent legal advice and counselling. The new provisions would apply only to embryos created after they come into force; embryos already in storage would remain subject to the current regime.
Conclusion
The proposed reform is desirable, practical and useful. It is desirable because the current law can produce unfair outcomes: one party’s unilateral decision can extinguish the other’s prospect of genetic parenthood without remedy. It is practical because it uses existing legal infrastructure, namely the Family Court, the HFEA’s Code of Practice, and enforcement mechanisms already familiar to family lawyers. It is useful because it resolves two problems that the current law cannot solve: it allows parties to secure their shared intentions in advance, reducing litigation where a valid agreement exists, and it provides a remedy where no enforceable agreement exists. Throughout, the court retains the discretion needed to protect both parties’ Article 8 rights. With 53,000 patients undergoing IVF in 2024, the law should allow couples to make their decisions about their embryos enforceable.